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Do Connections with Buy-Side Analysts 
Inform Sell-Side Analyst Research? 
1. Introduction 
Buy-side analysts play an important role in the stock market by producing information 
that supports the trading decisions of their affiliated portfolio managers. Unlike their sell-side 
counterparts, buy-side analysts have strong incentives to protect their private information, and 
thus do not publicize their research output (Cheng, Liu, & Qian 2006). Prior research suggests 
that institutional investors disseminate this information beyond the confines of their own firms 
only through their trading decisions (e.g., Chan & Lakonishok 1995; Chiyachantana, Jain, Jaing, 
& Wood 2004; Bushee & Goodman 2007, Foster, Gallahger, & Looi 2011, Guo & Qiu 2016). 
We investigate an alternative mechanism through which this private information finds its way 
into the public domain. Specifically, we posit that connections with institutional investors’ buy-
side analysts provide sell-side analysts with private information generated by the buy-side that 
enhances the quality of sell-side research reports.  
Connections can arise from buy-side analyst demand for information independently 
developed by sell-side analysts or for concierge services, such as access to company 
management. Interactions between the two analyst types create opportunities for the exchange of 
information about firms of mutual interest. Discussions about a particular firm might include 
topics such as the firm’s strategy, growth and value drivers, risks, management quality, and of 
course, earnings prospects. This paper investigates the following empirical question: through 
their connections with sell-side analysts, do buy-side analysts, perhaps unknowingly, leak 
information that enhances the quality of sell-side analyst research reports?  
A vast literature describes characteristics of sell-side analyst research and its impact on 
stock prices, arguably through the impact on institutional investor decisions. The research 
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literature generally assumes that the flow of information between sell-side and buy-side analysts 
is one-directional; i.e., information flows from sell-side analysts through buy-side analysts to 
portfolio managers, whose trades move stock prices (e.g., Gu, Li, Li, & Yang 2016; Irvine, 
Lipson, & Puckett, 2007; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2007). Our paper looks at the flow of 
information in the other direction; i.e., do insights from the research of buy-side analysts, in 
support of institutional investor decisions, flow to sell-side analysts and improve the quality of 
sell-side analyst research reports? 
Our primary measure of connections assumes that a sell-side analyst has opportunity to 
learn about a given firm’s prospects from an institution when the analyst also follows other 
stocks held in the institution’s portfolio. We expect the opportunity to increase in both the 
number of institutions the analyst is connected with and in the number of the overlapped other 
stocks. We further weight the number of other stocks by the value of each stock as a percentage 
of the institution’s total portfolio. The idea is that the larger this weighted number, the more 
important these other stocks are for the institution, the more discussions the sell-side analyst 
likely has with the institutional investor’s buy-side analysts, and thus, the more opportunities the 
sell-side analyst has to discern and process the private information possessed by this institutional 
investor. This weighted number of other stocks averaged across all institutional investors holding 
the given firm’s stock represents our primary unscaled CONNECTIONS variable.  
For three reasons, we use the sell-side analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy relative to 
other analysts covering the same firm as our primary proxy for the quality of that analyst’s 
research report. First, prior research shows that information in earnings forecasts affects analysts’ 
stock recommendations (e.g., Ertimur, Sunder, & Sunder 2007) and target price forecasts (e.g., 
Gleason, Johnson, & Li 2013), making earnings forecast accuracy a reasonable proxy for overall 
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sell-side analyst research quality. Second, earnings forecasts are more prevalent than stock 
recommendations and target price forecasts. Third, we can measure earnings forecast accuracy 
more precisely than the accuracy of stock recommendations and target price forecasts. For these 
reasons, our primary summary measure of the quality of a research report for a given analyst and 
a given firm is the absolute difference between the firm’s actual earnings and the analyst’s 
forecast of those earnings. We label this measure ACCURACY.  
For both ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS, as well as control variables, we hold 
constant the firm and year and measure the respective variable for a particular analyst relative to 
all other analysts following the same stock in the same year. This effectively avoids confounding 
effects of firm characteristics and time-variant macro effects likely to affect both ACCURACY 
and CONNECTIONS. For example, both ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS might be higher for 
firms of larger size or with higher institutional ownership (see e.g., Frankel, Kothari, & Weber 
2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2007). Using the extent of connections and accuracy relative to other 
analysts covering the same firm-year abstracts away the confounding effect of size or 
institutional ownership on forecast accuracy. We hypothesize and find that ACCURACY 
improves with CONNECTIONS until CONNECTIONS reaches a point of diminishing returns. 
This concave pattern is analogous to prior research that finds lower levels of earnings forecast 
accuracy among sell-side analysts who cover large numbers of firms. It is also consistent with 
Maber, Groysberg, & Healy 2015, who show that increasing high-touch services with 
institutional clients comes with opportunity costs limiting the time sell-side analysts spend on 
other accuracy-enhancing aspects of their research.  
From evidence consistent with the hypothesized non-linear relation between ACCURACY 
and CONNECTIONS, we infer that information from connections with buy-side analysts informs 
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sell-side analyst research. However, the relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS 
could be endogenous in that buy-side analysts select sell-side analysts who can provide insights 
that inform the buy-side analysts’ research reports, and that selection probably favors sell-side 
analysts who have already proven themselves in ways that might include forecast accuracy. We 
implement a number of analyses to mitigate the endogeneity concerns. 
In the first and second analyses, we examine the variation in the relation between 
ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS with private information of buy-side analysts or demand for 
such information from sell-side analysts. We generally find a stronger (weaker) relation when 
buy-side analysts have relatively more (less) private information. In addition, we find no 
evidence of a relation between sell-side analyst characteristics valued by buy-side analysts and 
the association between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS. This supports the inference that sell-
side analysts obtain forecast accuracy-enhancing information from buy-side analysts, as opposed 
to buy-side analysts seeking guidance from already-accurate sell-side analysts. Third, we find 
that our main finding is robust in a subsample of analysts with less than four years of firm-
specific experience. In those cases, the buy-side analyst has very little basis for judging the 
accuracy track record of the sell-side analyst with whom s/he chooses to work.  
Fourth, to further address endogeneoity and provide additional support for the caual 
interpretation of our results, we employ exogenous shocks to connections caused by acquisitions 
or bankruptcies of institutions with which the sell-side analysts are connected and examine 
changes in earnings forecast accuracy of these sell-side analysts. Using forecasts by analysts not 
connected with the affected institutions as a control group, we show that accuracy of forecasts by 
analysts with relatively low connections prior to the shocks, but not by those with high 
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connections, declines subsequent to the shocks. These results strengthen the casual interpretation 
of our results and support the inference of the curvilinear relation from the main results.  
Finally, we conduct a number of tests to check the robustness of our main results to 
alternative measures of connections and forecast accuracy, and the use of market reaction to 
recommendation revisions as an alternative proxy for analyst research report quality. Our results 
are robust to these alternative measures.  
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we open the door to a 
new avenue of research that can investigate the role of the bilateral flow of information between 
sell- and buy-side analysts in increasing the quality of information impounded in capital asset 
prices. Second, by furthering our understanding of the role that buy-side analysts play in 
financial markets, our paper contributes to the nascent literature that studies buy-side analysts 
(e.g., Jung, Wong, and Zhang 2017, Brown, et al. 2016, Cici & Rosenfeld 2016, Rebello & Wei 
2014). We identify a channel through which buy-side analysts’ private information flows to the 
stock market.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institutional 
setting. Section 3 reviews the literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our 
research design and sample selecton. Sections 5 and 6 present the results of our hypotheses tests 
and additional tests to address endogeneity, respectively. Section 7 presents robustness tests, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. Institutional Setting 
Buy-side analysts provide advice to portfolio managers working for entities that pool 
resources of individual investors and invest on their behalf. These entities house investment 
vehicles such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds; e.g., 
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Fidelity Investments, General Motors, Progressive Auto Insurance, and Bridgewater Associates. 
We refer to each of these entities as an institutional investor and each institutional investor 
employs buy-side analysts who interacts with one or more sell-side analysts. The majority of 
sell-side analysts work for full-service investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan 
Chase, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch (Cowen, Groysberg, & Healy 2006).   
The literature has extensively documented that sell-side analysts provide information to 
the buy-side (Ramnath, Rock, & Shane 2008a, 2008b; Bradshaw et al. 2017).  For example, 
Brown, Call, Clement, & Sharp (2017) surveyed investment relations professionals and 
discovered “that some buy-side analysts privately send questions or comments to sell-side 
analysts during the Q&A portion of the public earnings conference call (p. 36).” Nonetheless, 
academic and anecdotal evidence suggests that buy-side analysts generate information 
incremental to the information developed by sell-side analysts. Direct academic evidence comes 
from Rebello & Wei (2014), who conclude that “…buy-side analysts produce research that is 
very different from sell-side research…(p. 777).” They find that the opinions of buy-side 
analysts, as measured by their stock ratings, differ from the opinions of typical sell-side analysts 
and that trading strategies utilizing information contained in those opinions can generate 
significant risk-adjusted returns over the next year. Bushee, Jung, & Miller (2017) document that 
trade sizes around investor-management meeting times increase and abnormal net buys around 
the meetings are profitable during thirty days subsequent to the private access day. They 
conclude that the private access to management provides information that changes institutional 
investors’ beliefs and trading. Such beliefs-changing information, which is unlikely to be in the 
information set of sell-side analysts could be “mosaic” but, nonetheless, valuable in combination 
7 
 
with institutional investors’ private information and does not violate “Reg FD” (Solomon & 
Soltes, 2015).  
Supporting anecdotal evidence suggests that buy-side analysts often get preferential 
access to the management of public companies and this provides an advantage in efforts to 
generate precise information. For example, during a June 22, 2016 conference call announcing 
the $2.8 billion acquisition of SolarCity, Tesla’s CEO, Elon Musk acknowledged that, over the 
years in private discussions with institutional shareholders, he “bandied about” the idea of 
combining Tesla Motors with SolarCity (Reuters 2016). The article also suggests that at least one 
institutional investor, a Fidelity portfolio manager, benefited from trading on foreknowledge of 
the merger. In another article, David Strasser, a former sell-side analyst at Janney Montgomery 
Scott LLC, stated that in the meetings he arranged between institutional investors and the 
companies he followed, he “was sometimes asked to sit outside the room so investors could ask 
questions without him” (Ng & Gryta 2017).1  
Although buy-side analysts keep their research private and restrict access to the private 
information developed from their research to only their firm’s portfolio managers (Cheng, et al. 
2006; Groysberg, Healy, and Chapman 2008), at least two factors make sell-side analysts privy 
to some part of this information. First, learning what other buy-side analysts think and sharing 
that with institutional clients is implicitly expected of sell-side analysts. Brown, et al. (2016) 
surveyed and interviewed buy-side analysts who indicated that their demand for sell-side analyst 
services depends, primarily, on: (i) the ability of sell-side analysts to facilitate meaningful one-
on-one interaction with CFOs and other knowledgeable executives working for the firms with 
                                                          
1 Holding constant the effects of their interaction with each other, further reason to believe buy-side analysts have 
information incremental to the information developed by sell-side analysts is provided in: Martin (2005); 
Abramowitz (2006); Retkwa (2009); Frey & Herbst (2014); Jung, et al. (2017); and Groysberg, Healy, Serafeim & 
Shanthikumar (2013). 
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significant representation in their institution’s portfolios;  (ii) the quality of sell-side analysts’ 
industry-related research; and (iii) insights sell-side analysts provide into the perspective of buy-
side analysts working for other institutional investors. Institutional investors could, and 
increasingly do, internalize the first two services, but they must outsource the third service, 
which incentivizes sell-side analysts to discover their buy-side analyst clients’ perspectives on 
the firms the sell-side analysts follow.2 
Second, sell-side analysts have many opportunities to learn from buy-side analysts. The 
lion share of a typical sell-side analyst’s compensation is driven by broker votes, which are in 
turn driven by personalized services that sell-side analysts provide for institutional clients 
including high-touch meetings, phone calls, whitepapers, and concierge services that put buy-
side analysts in touch with the management of firms of interest (Maber, et al. 2015). Thus, sell-
side analysts have a strong incentive to provide high-touch services, which necessitate regular 
communication with current or potential institutional investor clients.  
Based on a sample of sell-side analysts at a mid-size investment bank, Maber et al. 
(2015) document that the average sell-side analyst holds approximately 750 private calls and 45 
one-on-one meetings with client investors in the course of a typical semiannual period. From the 
perspective of the buy-side, when Brown et al. (2016) asked buy-side analysts how often they 
have private communication with sell-side analysts, 55% of their respondents said more than 23 
times per year and only 4% said “never.” These communications provide sell-side analysts with 
opportunities to uncover and put together various pieces of information produced by institutional 
                                                          
2 This differs from information spillovers documented in other studies. For example, Hameed, Morck, Shen, & 
Yeung (2015) find that sell-side analysts follow stocks whose fundamentals have the greatest correlation with those 
of other firms in the industry. The information developed about these “bellweather” firm stocks benefits investors in 
less closely followed stocks. In another study, Muslu, Rebello, & Xu (2014) find that analysts contribute to stock 
comovement by developing value-relevant information common to the firms in their portfolio of followed firms. 
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investors. For example, Stephen Byrd, a managing director of research at Morgan Stanley told us 
“when I speak to a variety of institutional clients, I get a strong sense for the investor debates that 
really matter for a stock. That helps me to understand what catalysts are likely to move a stock. 
We all have access to the same information, though sometimes our clients track certain catalysts 
more closely than we do (whereas sometimes we are closer to a particular catalyst).”3  
We argue that the regular communications with their institutional clients provide sell-side 
analysts with a window into the private information generated by their institutional clients about 
companies of common interest. Specifically, as both parties engage in conversations, the 
questions raised and the requests for clarifications made by the institutional clients tip off sell-
side analysts about the private information of their institutional clients. In this regard, Groysberg, 
Healy, & Chapman (2008) speculate that “sell-side analysts may develop an information 
advantage through feedback on their ideas from their own institutional clients (p. 33).” That sell-
side analysts discern the private information of their institutional clients in the course of such 
communications is supported by the fact that many buy-side analysts view the knowledge that 
sell-side analysts have of other buy-side analysts’ opinions as a valuable service provided by the 
sell-side (Brown et al. 2016). Furthermore, the results of the Brown et al. interviews suggest that 
buy-side analysts value their relationships with sell-side analysts, because “they are the only 
portal” into the thinking of buy-side analysts working for other institutions. Quoting one of their 
interviewees, “The buy side is this whole poker game of, ‘I don't want to show my cards, but I 
want to see your cards.’ The only people that can actually see everyone's cards is the sell side. 
When we ask them questions, they can figure out what we're thinking.” 
                                                          
3 Also, Greg Melich, a partner and senior analyst at MoffettNathanson told us that in the course of a typical 
interaction with an institutional client he might be alerted of a new piece of public information of which he was not 
aware. For example, the institutional client might have just learned that a certain company became a supplier of 
Target Corporation and pass that information along. 
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Given the information environment described above, the next section develops 
hypotheses concerning the relation between the quality of a sell-side analyst research report and 
the degree of connectedness between the sell-side analyst and the buy-side analysts she serves. 
3. Hypotheses and Literature Review 
Main hypothesis 
Section 2 suggests that sell-side analysts have strong incentives to interact with buy-side 
analysts and refers to previous research and anecdotal evidence that those interactions occur 
frequently. Presumably, more connections with institutional investors’ buy-side analysts provide 
more opportunities for sell-side analysts to discern the institutional investors’ private information 
which, in turn, informs sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts and improves their forecast 
accuracy. Thus, we expect sell-side analyst forecast ACCURACY to be positively correlated with 
CONNECTIONS with institutional investors. 
On the other hand, it is costly for analysts to spread themselves too thinly. For example, 
there appears to be a cost associated with following too many firms (Clement 1999; Jacob, et al. 
1999; Myring & Wrege 2011; Pelletier 2015). We expect that for each sell-side analyst there is a 
cost associated with providing the services associated with too many connections. Too many 
connections with buy-side analysts are likely to come with an opportunity cost that outweighs the 
benefit of other sell-side analyst activities, such as independent research, nurturing relationships 
with the buy-side analysts who matter most, connecting with management of the firms they 
follow, and writing whitepapers and research reports. This is consistent with Maber, et al. (2015) 
who show that increases in analysts’ time-consuming services for their institutional clients result 
in less published research output. Thus, we expect the positive impact of CONNECTIONS on 
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ACCURACY to exhibit diminishing returns as the number of interactions with different buy-side 
analysts increases. In light of this reasoning, we hypothesize the following relation:  
H1: ACCURACY increases with CONNECTIONS up to some point where the increasing 
rate subsides.   
 
On the other hand, if buy-side analysts successfully maintain the confidentiality of their private 
information when communicating with sell-side analysts, then we expect to find no evidence of a 
relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS. 
Additional hypotheses 
Given evidence of the relation hypothesized in H1, we test additional hypotheses that 
identify factors expected to strengthen the relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS. 
We develop these additional hypotheses to provide more confidence in the validity of H1 and to 
address the endogeneity issue discussed in Section 1.4 That is, the tests are designed to sort out 
whether the relation observed in tests of H1 emerges from sell-side analysts obtaining accuracy-
enhancing information from buy-side analysts, or from buy-side analysts seeking connections 
with already-accurate sell-side analysts.   
We predict greater sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS in situations where 
sell-side analysts have more opportunities to learn from their buy-side analyst counterparts, 
which would arise when sell-side analysts are connected with certain buy-side analysts who 
produce relatively large amounts of private information. If, on the other hand, ACCURACY 
drives CONNECTIONS because buy-side analysts have more need for information from sell-side 
analysts, then we expect greater sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS in situations 
where sell-side analysts have less opportunities to learn from their buy-side analyst counterparts. 
                                                          
4 Note that endogenous selection of more accurate sell-side analysts cannot explain a weakened relation between 
ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS beyond a certain level of CONNECTIONS.  
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Such situations arise when sell-side analysts are connected with certain buy-side analysts who 
produce relatively small amounts of private information. This discussion leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2: The sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS increases with the opportunity 
for sell-side analysts to learn from buy-side analysts.   
 
We next examine the possibility that buy-side analysts’ demand for information from 
sell-side analysts drives the relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS. In that respect, 
we hypothesize that:  
H3: The sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS increases with buy-side analyst 
demand for connections with sell-side analysts. 
 
We expect greater buy-side analyst demand for connections with sell-side analysts 
predicted to produce more informative research output, proxied by earnings forecast accuracy. 
Strong predictors of sell-side analyst forecast accuracy include past accuracy (Brown 2001) and 
firm-specific experience (Clement 1999; Brown, et. al. 2016).5 Thus, if buy-side demand drives 
the relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS, then we expect to find evidence 
supporting H3; i.e., we expect the relation to strengthen with sell-side analyst firm-specific 
experience and past earnings forecast accuracy. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Measurement of CONNECTIONS 
Our primary connection variable assumes that analyst a learns more about firm f as the 
analyst is connected with more institutions and follows more other stocks held by an institution. 
We let each of these other stocks proxy for a connection around f between a and i during year t 
                                                          
5 In response to the Brown, et al. (2016) survey, buy-side analysts rate the sell-side analyst’s firm-specific 
experience as the most important attribute affecting the decision to use information provided by the sell-side analyst. 
In fact, this attribute is rated as more important than how often the sell-side analyst speaks with firm management, 
and whether the sell-side analyst is a member of the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team. 
13 
 
(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆#𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑖 ), and we weight each connection with the value of the stock as a 
percentage of i’s total portfolio to incorporate the importance of the stock to i and thus, likely 
more interactions between a and i. The average weighted number of connections, across all 
institutions holding f, is our primary proxy for how much a learns about f from interactions with 
buy-side analysts in period t,  
CONNECTIONSaft =  
∑ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆#𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅#𝑓𝑡
 , 
where INST_OWNER#ft is the number of institutions holding f. Hence, our primary measure 
considers both the breadth (as reflected in the number of connected institutions) and depth (as 
reflected in the weighted number of other overlapping stocks) of connection. We expect that, the 
greater CONNECTIONSaft, the greater the breadth and depth of dialogue between a and 
institutional investors holding f, and the greater the opportunity for the sell-side analyst to 
discern and process the private information possessed by these institutional investors.  
To further illustrate the construction of our CONNECTIONS measure, consider the 
example in figure 1. There we see that the stock of interest, f1, is held by three institutional 
investors. Analyst a1 is strongly connected, having connections (beyond f1) with each of the 
three institutional investors holding f1 through stocks other than f1 that account for 95%, 80%, 
and 90%, respectively, of the corresponding institution’s portfolio. Hence a1’s CONNECTIONS 
measure is 0.883 [(0.95+0.80+0.90)/3]. On the other hand, analyst a2 has no connections 
(beyond f1) with the institutional investors holding f1. Hence a2’s CONNECTIONS measure is 0 
[(0+0+0)/3].   
Our approach to measuring CONNECTIONS avoids the confounding effect of 
institutional ownership on forecast accuracy (Frankel, et al. 2006; Ljungqvist, et al. 2007). Our 
measure does not relate to institutional ownership of a firm. Specifically, for analysts following 
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the same company f, differences in our CONNECTIONS measure depends on differences across 
analysts in their following of stocks other than f (and not on the number of f’s shares owned by 
institutions). As we describe in detail in Section 4.2, we further scale CONNECTIONS within the 
same firm-year to control for both time-variant and firm-invariant characteristics.  
4.2 Models for testing H1 
To examine the hypothesized diminishing impact of CONNECTIONS on ACCURACY, we 
use the quadratic form below (see Wooldridge 2016, p636; and Aghion et al. 2005). If analysts 
produce more accurate forecasts due to the private information they collect from their 
connections with institutional investors, we expect 𝛽1 > 0 in model (1) below. In addition, if 
analysts face diminished returns beyond some level of connections with institutional investors, 
we expect 𝛽2 < 0.  
ACCURACYaft = β0 + β1CONNECTIONSaft +β2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 +εaft  (1), 
 
where, ACCURACYaft is measured as 
max(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)−|𝐹𝐸𝑎𝑓𝑡|
max(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)−min(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)
, i.e., absolute error of analyst a’s forecast 
for firm f and year t (Faft) scaled to fall between 0 (least accurate) and 1 (most accurate), relative 
to all other analysts following firm f in year t.  
 We include the following variables to control for factors that could affect forecast 
accuracy: analyst a’s forecast accuracy for the lagged year (ACCURACYaf,t-1), the number of 
firms a follows (FIRM#at), the number of industries a follows (INDUSTRY#at), the number of 
years a has been forecasting firm f’s earnings (FIRM_EXPaft), brokerage size (BSIZEat), the 
number of days between a’s forecast and the most recent one-year ahead forecast for the same 
firm-year by any analyst (DAYSaft), a’s earnings forecast frequency (EPS_FREQaft), the number 
of days between the date of a’s forecast and the end of fiscal year t (HORIZONaft). INDUSTRY#, 
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FIRM#, BSIZE, and EPS_FREQ are measured for the year ending with the date of Faft. We 
define all these variables in detail in the Appendix.  
CONNECTIONSaft and all control variables except ACCURACYaf,t-1 are scaled to fall 
between 0 and 1 based on the equation below: 
 𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡−min (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡)
max(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡)−min(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡)
   
By scaling all dependent and independent variables among analysts following the same 
firm and year, we control for all firm-invariant characteristics and time-variant macro factors that 
affect forecast accuracy (e.g., forecast difficulty as described in Hong and Kubik 2003). Scaling all 
variables in this manner maintains the relative values of each variable, while allowing 
comparison across regression coefficients (Clement & Tse, 2005). 
We also employ a piecewise regression (2) below, which allows us to calculate the 
sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS in each CONNECTIONS tercile. 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑎𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
3
𝑘=1  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡      (2) 
where 𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 is an indicator variable equaling one for the kth 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 tercile 
(1=lowest, 2=middle, and 3=highest), where tercile cut-off points are derived from the 
distribution of scaled CONNECTIONS. Under H1, we expect 𝛽1
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 >  𝛽3
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒. 
4.3 Model for testing H2 
If the sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS increases when buy-side analysts 
produce greater amounts of private information creating greater opportunity for sell-side analysts 
to learn from connections with buy-side analysts, then, in support of H2, we expect β1 > β5 in 
model (3) below. Alternatively, if the sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS increases 
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because buy-side analysts with less private information seek connection with already-accurate 
sell-side analysts, then we expect β1 < β5. 
ACCURACYaft = β0 + β1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
+ β2(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2 
+β3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝
+β4(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2+β5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
+ 
β6(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡    (3) 
 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 is constructed by: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝 =
∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆#𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑖
𝑖 ×𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅#𝑓𝑡
 , and    
 
𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑃𝑃
𝑖
 denotes an institutional investor from which sell-side analysts have high (=1) or lower 
(=0) opportunities to acquire useful information. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅#𝑓𝑡 denotes the number of 
institutional investors holding stock f at time t. Similar to CONNECTIONS, we scale 
CONNECTIONSHigh Opp to fall between 0 and 1 among analysts following the same firm and 
year. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
are constructed similarly. Note that 
normalizing the high/lower opportunity connections variables by 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅#𝑓𝑡 ensures that 
they add up to 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡. 
We apply three approaches to identifying institutional investors that provide high versus 
low accuracy-enhancing learning opportunities for sell-side analysts. The first approach follows 
Bushee (1998, 2001) and classifies institutions into transient, dedicated, and quasi-index 
institutions.6 The transient institutions are active traders with high portfolio turnover and 
diversified portfolios, which are presumably active collectors of information (Ke and Petroni 
2004). We thus view them as higher-opportunity institutions relative to the dedicated and quasi-
index types, which we classify, respectively, as medium and low opportunity institutions.  
                                                          
6 We thank Brian Bushee for sharing the classification of institutional investors. We group the institutions 
unclassified by Bushee into one group and include analyst connections with them and its squared term in the 
regressions. The coefficicents on connections with these institutions are generally insignificant.     
17 
 
The second approach relies on an institution’s portfolio turnover. The idea is that 
institutions that are able to generate more private information will likely trade more in order to 
exploit that information. Along these lines, Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) argue that 
managers who generate superior information “... trade frequently, while managers with more 
limited skills may be much more cautious in their trades.” Consistent with this, Chen et al. 
(2000) and Massa, Qian, and Zhang (2015) find that institutions with higher portfolio turnover 
exhibit superior investment performance. Building on these findings, we view institutions with 
higher (lower) turnover as providing higher (lower) learning opportunities for sell-side analysts.     
The third approach builds on Petajisto (2013) by classifying institutions from his five 
investment categories − stock pickers, concentrated stock pickers, moderately active stock 
pickers, closet indexers, and factor bettors − into active stock selectors and passive stock 
selectors. Specifically, we classify the first three categories of institutions as active stock 
selectors, and classify the last two categories as passive stock selectors, and view the former 
group as higher-opportunity institutions relative to the latter group. The rationale is that active 
stock selectors focus on analyzing individual stocks and potentially have more private 
information about individual stocks while passive stock selectors focus on replicating an index or 
placing factor bets without as much attention to individual stock analysis. Petajisto (2013, p82) 
uses a two-way stratification approach by first ranking all institutions by Active Share and then 
by Tracking Error to create a five by five grid and assign institutions in each cell to one of the 
five investment categories.  
Similar to Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we compute Active Share as the sum of the 
absolute differences between the weight of an institution’s portfolio and the weight of each stock 
in the market portfolio, i.e., the CRSP stock universe. Tracking Error is computed as the standard 
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deviation of residuals from regressing monthly excess portfolio returns on the excess returns on 
the CRSP market index over the last three years. Monthly excess portfolio returns are computed 
by subtracting the monthly risk-free return from the portfolio return.7 In essence, Tracking Error 
captures the variation in the returns of the portfolio not explained by the market portfolio 
benchmark. 
4.4 Model for testing H3  
To test whether the sensitivity of forecast accuracy to connections increases with sell-side 
analyst demand for information from the buy side or with buy-side analyst demand for 
information from the sell-side, we employ the following regression model. 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑎𝑓𝑡         
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2    
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷+ 𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡                             
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚
𝑚
+ 𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡      (4), 
where DEMAND represents firm-specific experience (FIRM_EXP) or forecast accuracy measure 
for the prior year (lagged ACCURACY), both of which are as defined in model (1). If buy-side 
demand drives the relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS, we expect β4 > 0. 
4.5 Sample selection 
We employ the following sample construction steps. For fiscal years from 1995 to 2016, 
the latest full year with available data at the time of our analysis, from I/B/E/S we collect one-
year ahead EPS forecasts issued during the first 90 days following the prior year’s earnings 
announcement, and consensus analyst recommendations issued during the year. If an analyst 
issues more than one forecast for the same firm-year during the 90-day window, we keep only 
the earliest one. In the latest calendar quarter prior to the 90-day window for each firm-year 
                                                          
7 Risk-free returns are from Ken French’s website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
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described above, we collect the number of institutional investors and their holdings for the 
construction of CONNECTIONS and other measures using institutional holdings from the 
Thomson Reuters 13F database. We collect institution classifications that label institutions as 
transient, dedicated, and quasi-index types from Bushee’s website, and stock returns used for 
computing institution portfolio returns from CRSP. We exclude analyst-firm-years missing any 
of the analyst characteristic control variables, such as the lagged forecast error. Finally, we 
require each firm-year to be covered by more than one analyst during the 90-day window. These 
steps result in 189,452 analyst-firm-year observations, including 4,564 unique firms and 8,790 
unique analysts. 
5. Hypotheses Test Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for variables in our models, along with 
some variable components. With the exception of ACCURACY, no variable is scaled among 
analysts for the same firm-year. Panel A shows that the distribution of absolute analyst-firm-year 
forecast error divided by the absolute value of actual earnings, |FE|, has a mean (median) of 
0.768 (0.132). The ACCURACY variable used in our hypotheses tests scales |FE| to fall in a 
range from 0 to 1. The mean (median) of ACCURACY is 0.535 (0.561). The CONNECTIONS 
variable indicates that, on average, analysts have connections through stocks that account for 
1.3% of an institution’s portfolio. On average, 6.8 other stocks (CONNECTIONSstock#) overlap 
between stocks an analyst follows and stocks an institution holds (untabulated).  
Panel A also shows that, in an average analyst-firm-year, a given analyst follows stocks 
in 3.9 different industries, has about 5 years of experience forecasting earnings of the followed 
firm, works for a brokerage house or research firm employing 66 analysts, issues forecasts 4.3 
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days after the most recent forecast by any analyst following the same firm, has issued 6 one-year 
ahead earnings forecasts in the year prior to the current forecast for the same firm, and has a 309-
day forecast horizon until the end of the fiscal year.  
Table 1 Panel B presents the univariate correlations among the variables used to test our 
hypotheses, where all variables are scaled among analysts following the same firm-year. Mostly 
consistent with prior literature, our measure of relative within firm-year ACCURACY has a 
statistically significantly positive correlation with the prior year’s ACCURACY, the analyst’s 
firm-specific experience, and number of firms followed; and ACCURACY is negatively 
correlated with the number of days since the most recent preceding analyst forecast, forecast 
frequency, number of industries followed, and the horizon between the forecast and the 
upcoming annual earnings announcement date. ACCURACY is negatively correlated with 
CONNECTIONS, before considering the impact and importance of modeling the hypothesized 
non-linear (concave) relation between these variables. 
Table 1 Panel C offers an explanation for the negative univariate correlation between 
ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS observed in Panel B. Consistent with the hypothesized 
concave relation between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS, Panel C shows that for the above-
median (at or below-median) ranges of CONNECTIONS, the correlation is significantly negative 
(positive) at -0.020 (0.017). The higher absolute value of the correlation in the higher range of 
CONNECTIONS arguably provides a reason for a negative overall relation in Panel B. Visually 
corroborating this pattern, Figure 2 depicts ACCURACY across the quintiles of CONNECTIONS 
and shows an overall increasing (decreasing) pattern in both the mean and median of 
ACCURACY when CONNECTIONS is in the lower (higher) range. The concave pattern holds 
both when we use the scaled measure, ACCURACY, and when we use an unscaled measure, 
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−1*mean deflated |FE|. These results support the hypothesized non-linear concave relation 
between ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS and confirm our design choices in models (1) and (2) 
that explicitly account for the nonlinearity. 
5.2 Test of H1 
 Table 2 displays the results of testing H1, which predicts that the accuracy of an analyst’s 
forecast of a firm’s earnings improves, to a point of diminishing returns, with the degree of 
connectedness between the analyst and institutional investors who hold the firm’s stock in their 
portfolios. For ease of presentation, we multiply the dependent variable in all regressions by 100. 
This has the effect of multiplying each coefficient by 100, as well. Results estimated from both 
the quadratic forms in columns (1) and (2) and the piecewise regressions in columns (3) and (4) 
with or without control variables support H1. 
In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on CONNECTIONS is significantly positive and 
the coefficient on the square of CONNECTIONS is significantly negative (with p-values less than 
0.01). These results support the curvilinear concave relation predicted by H1. The results suggest 
that ACCURACY reaches its highest level when CONNECTIONS is at 0.419 
[=4.818/(5.751×2)], or the 61st percentile of the its distribution. Consistent with the evidence 
portrayed in Figure 2, the significant coefficient on CONNECTIONS2 provides justification for 
including the squared term in the regression specification. Not doing so would result in a biased 
coefficient on CONNECTIONS since the omitted variable, CONNECTIONS2, is 
correlated with both CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY (Greene 2008, p134).8  
                                                          
8 As shown in Table 1, CONNECTIONS and CONNECTIONS2 are highly correlated. However, as Aiken and West 
(1991, p.35) and Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990, p31) point out, a high correlation between the independent 
variable and its quadratic term does not result in biased estimation of the coefficients, although it does increase the 
standard error for the coefficient estimate of the independent variable. See Greene (2008, p136) for a technical proof 
of this in the context of including an irrelevant variable. We document statistical significance for the coefficient of 
CONNECTIONS despite its standard error being inflated. We also use two ways suggested by the above 
econometricians to address the high correlation. The first way uses the centered measure that subtracts from 
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The economic significance, perhaps becomes more apparent in column (4) where we 
perform a piecewise estimation of CONNECTIONS by terciles. The coefficient on 
CONNECTIONS in the lowest tercile of the variable is 13.740, which means that a one-standard 
deviation change in CONNECTIONS for the lowest tercile (0.356, untabulated) is associated with 
a 4.891% (0.356×13.740) change in ACCURACY, which is 9.1% of the variable’s mean 
(0.0489/0.535). The lower coefficient on CONNECTIONS in the second tercile and the 
insignificant coefficient in the highest tercile further support the nonlinear relation documented 
in Panel C of Table 1 and predicted by H1; i.e., once the analyst’s average amount of 
connections per institution becomes too large, diminishing returns to additional connections 
become apparent. The coefficient on CONNECTIONS in the lowest tercile is significantly larger 
than that in the higher terciles, with a p-value (untabulated) less than 0.01. Relations between 
ACCURACY and control variables are consistent with the correlations in Panel B of Table 1 and 
prior literature. 
5.3 Tests of H2 
Results in Table 2 (discussed above) confirm H1 in that the strongest relation between 
CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY occurs among low-connections analysts and, as 
CONNECTIONS increases, the relation reaches a point of diminishing returns. We examine H2 
to sort out whether the curvilinear relation between CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY derives 
from opportunities for lower-accuracy sell-side analysts to learn from CONNECTIONS with 
private information-laden buy-side analysts (i.e., the high-opportunity ones), or from 
                                                          
CONNECTIONS its mean. The centered measure and its square have a correlation at 0.608. The other way replaces 
CONNECTIONS and CONNECTIONS2 with a single term (CONNECTIONS - CONNECTIONS2) to remove the 
multicollinearity in the estimation. The second way builds on the assumption that there is a curvilinear relation 
between CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY and the turning point is when CONNECTIONS takes the value of 0.5. 
Both sets of results support a curvilinear relation between CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY. These results again 
indicate that the high correlation between CONNECTIONS and CONNECTIONS2 does not drive our results.    
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opportunities for private information-lacking buy-side analysts (i.e., the low-opportunity ones) to 
learn from CONNECTIONS with already-accurate sell-side analysts. 
As discussed in Section 4.3, we rely on three variables − used in prior literature to 
characterize institutional investor trading strategies − to proxy for the degree to which buy-side 
analysts produce private information. Results in Table 3 for both the quadratic and piecewise 
regressions shows that the relation between CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY is generally only 
significant for connections with institutions having transient, high-turnover, or active trading 
strategies. We assume that institutions with these trading strategies tend to produce  more private 
information, along with high levels of sell-side analyst learning opportunities. These results 
support H2, which predicts that the sensitivity of ACCURACY to CONNECTIONS increases with 
sell-side analyst learning opportunities.9 The results also help alleviate the endogeneity concern 
that institutions choose to connect with already-accurate analysts. Such a preference suggests a 
stronger relation between sell-side analyst ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS with low 
opportunity institutions, which is opposite to what we find.  
5.4 Test of H3 
Table 4 displays results from tests of H3, which predicts that more demand for 
information by buy-side analysts strengthens the relation between CONNECTIONS and 
ACCURACY. We find that neither the firm-specific experience proxy in column (1) nor the past-
accuracy proxy in column (2) has a statistically significant interactive effect with the connections 
variable. Untabulated results based on piecewise regressions are consistent with Table 4.  
                                                          
9 In terms of economic significance, untabulated results (available upon request) indicate that when sell-side analysts 
connect with buy-side analysts working for institutions with, respectively, transient, high-turnover, or active trading 
strategies, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in CONNECTIONS with these high-opportunity institutions 
corresponds to an 8.8%, 7.6%, or 10.0% increase, respectively, in ACCURACY.  
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Overall, we believe that our tests of H2 and H3 provide supporting evidence that sell-side 
interest in connecting with buy-side analysts in order to glean information that improves the 
quality of sell-side research reports drives the relation we find between ACCURACY and 
CONNECTIONS. The next section describes the results of additional robustness tests. 
6. Additional Tests to Address Endogeneity   
6.1 Another Look at Reverse Causality 
Results described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 mitigate the concern that rather than 
connections with information-laden buy-side analysts improving sell-side analyst forecast 
accuracy, less information-laden buy-side analysts may choose to work with sell-side analysts 
with the best earnings forecast accuracy track records. To further address this concern, we 
constrain the sample to sell-side analysts with less than four years of firm-specific experience. 
We argue that these analysts do not have enough of an accuracy track record to attract the 
interest of buy-side analysts in the companies they cover. In this subsample, we expect that our 
firm-specific experience variable is not significant, while all of the other results still hold. 
Untabulated results mirror the results testing H1 in Table 2, except that, as expected, the firm-
specific experience variable is no longer significantly related to forecast accuracy. Thus, our 
inferences remain unchanged in that connections with buy-side analysts enhance sell-side analyst 
forecast accuracy (not the other way around). 
6.2 Exogenous shocks to connections 
In this section, we identify events that likely exogenously diminish the connections 
between analysts and institutional investors and examine subsequent changes in analyst forecast 
accuracy. In particular, we collect institutions being acquired or liquidated from the following 
three sources. From Thomson Reuters we identify all institutions that stopped filing 13F reports 
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between 1995 and 2016 and held more than 100 stocks on average. We then retain those that 
were either acquired (per Thomson One Banker) or liquidated (per bankruptcy announcements 
from Capital IQ). This procedure results in a subsample that includes 146 institutions.  
We retain all firms held by the aforementioned institutions in the portfolios they reported 
on their last 13F filing (hereafter, the event). For each stock f held by affected institution i and 
followed by analyst a during the event quarter, we consider a and i to be unconnected if a has 
followed only f and no other stock held by i in the four quarters ending with the event quarter. In 
these cases, the indicator variable, CONNECTED, equals 0. CONNECTED equals 1 if a followed 
stocks held by i other than f in the event quarter and in at least one of the previous three quarters.  
We employ a difference-in-differences design and compare changes in accuracy of 
forecast issued by connected versus unconnected analysts from pre- to post-event periods. We 
define whether a forecast is pre- or post-event (POST_EVENT = 0 or 1, respectively) based on 
whether the forecast is issued before or more than three months after the event. We use three 
months to allow for the possibility that connection and information flow do not abruptly stop. 
For this analysis, we retain only forecasts issued within two years of the events and only analysts 
that issue one or more annual forecasts for the same firm in both periods. If a forecast is in the 
pre- or post-event period for multiple events, we use the forecast only once. This process results 
in 52,369 forecasts, with a mean (median) of 3.8 (3.0) forecasts for each firm-year and event.  
Based on evidence of the non-linear relation between accuracy and connections we 
document in the prior tests, for analysts with lower pre-event connections we expect higher 
decline in accuracy due to the exogenous termination of connections with certain institutions. 
Another reason for this empirical prediction is that, for such analysts, previous connections with 
the affected institutions represented a higher fraction of total connections with institutions. 
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Therefore, subsequent to the acquisitions of liquidation of the affected institution, the flow of 
information from institutions to sell-side analysts is more severely reduced. We classify an 
analyst as being in the lower (higher) connections group, if her scaled connection among all 
analysts covering the same firm-year is at or below (above) the median of the total sample at 
0.2775 (untabualted).10, 11 
We regress ACCURACY on CONNECTED and POST_EVENT dummies and their 
interaction. The key variable is the interaction variable, which helps determine whether the 
decline in accuracy was larger for the connected relative to the unconnected analysts after the 
event. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 report results for the total sample, lower connections 
subsample, and higher connections subsample, respectively, for the analysis that relies on use the 
scaled measure of forecast accuracy (ACCURACY). The interaction term is insignificant for the 
total sample, but more importantly, it is significantly negative for the lower connections 
subsample, which suggests that the analysts with lower connections experienced a drop in 
accuracy following the negative shock to their connections. For the higher connections 
subsample, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, although insignificant. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 5 use the unscaled measure of forecast accuracy (-mean 
deflated |FE|). The results show that our inference is insensitive to whether forecast accuracy is 
scaled. Overall, this analysis provides further support for a causal interpretation of our finding 
that additional connections for analysts benefit them in the form of higher accuracy up to a 
certain level of connections, beyond which the rate of increase subsides. 
                                                          
10 Results are similar when we use an analyst-firm’s standing within the main sample to classify lower or higher 
connections group.  
11 The small number of forecasts for each firm-year-event renders the ranking infeasible for about 52% observations. 
The analyses in Table 5 omit the control variables to preserve the sample. Results are qualitatively similar after 
including unscaled control variables or scaled control variables for a subset of observations, with albeit weaker 
statistical significance for the subsample. 
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7. Robustness Tests 
7.1 Alternative Measures of CONNECTIONS 
We replicate our test of H1 using three alternative proxies for connections between sell-
side and buy-side analysts by varying the emphasis and measures of breadth and depth of the 
connectedness. The first alternative, CONNECTIONStime, is the same as our primary measure 
except that, instead of summing up position size of all other stocks in the portfolio of each 
connected institution, we sum the number of months each connected institution has held the 
stock. Here the holding period captures a stock’s importance to an institution’s portfolio. The 
second alternative, CONNECTIONSstock#, modifies our primary CONNECTIONS measure by 
taking the straight average number of connections without weighting them. The third alternative, 
CONNECTIONSinst#, measures the number of institutions that invest in both the stock of interest 
and at least one other stock followed by the same analyst. This alternative treats all institutions 
with whom an analyst is connected equally, thus emphasizing breadth over depth of connections. 
Like our primary measure, all alternative measures are divided by the number of institutions 
holding the firm of interest and scaled among analysts following the same firm-year. 
The results in Table 6 using all three alternative proxies for CONNECTIONS are 
consistent with the results of tests of H1 reported in Table 2. These results increase our 
confidence in the construct validity of our primary CONNECTIONS variable as a measure of 
both breadth and depth of connections between sell-side analysts and institutions holding stocks 
that the analyst follows. Moreover, statistical and economic significance of the results using the 
alternative proxies suggest that all of these dimensions of connectivity benefit the accuracy of the 
corresponding connected analysts.            
7.2 Sensitivity of results to alternative measures of forecast accuracy and additional controls 
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As described in Section 4.2, our main analyses scale the dependent and independent variables 
among observations of the same firm-year to abstract away from across-firm and across-year 
differences. In Table 7, we estimate regression models (1) and (2) (used to test H1) after 
replacing the scaled forecast accuracy with the raw measure of absolute forecast error multiplied 
by (−1). For comparability across firms, following Clement (1999), Jacob, Lys, and Neale 
(1999), and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008), we divide the raw measure by the mean absolute forecast 
error for the same firm-year. The results support the validity of inferences based on tests of H1 
by showing a similarly significant non-linear relation between CONNECTIONS and this 
alternative measure of forecast accuracy.  
7.3 Market reaction to recommendation revisions and connections with institutions 
To proxy for the quality of sell-side analyst research output, as an alternative to earnings 
forecast accuracy, we use the market reaction to recommendation revisions, which reflects the 
informativenss of sell-side recommendations. For each analyst-firm-year observation in our main 
sample, we further collect the earliest recommendation issued in 90 days subsequent to prior 
annual earnings announcement. We require each firm-year to have two or more 
recommendations. For this subsample of 11,550 observations, we calculate recommendation 
changes relative to the most recent prior recommendation by the same analyst for the same firm, 
with a positive value indicating an upgrade. We regress cumulative abnormal stock returns, 
measured during three days around the recommendation revision date, on recommendation 
revisions (∆REC), the connection variables, and their interactions. 
As presented in the first column of Table 8, we document a stronger market reaction to 
recommendation revisions by analysts with higher institutional investor connections, as 
suggested by the positive coefficient on ∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS, but up to a certain level of 
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connections, as suggested by the negative coefficient on ∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS2. The last 
column of Table 8 presents results from interacting ∆REC with the terciles of connections. 
Market reaction becomes stronger with connections only in the bottom tercile. These results are 
consistent with our findings regarding earnings forecast accuracy and enhance our inference that 
sell-side analysts’ connections with institutional investors influence the quality of their research 
output.12    
8. Conclusion 
A plethora of research papers examine the impact of sell-side financial analyst research 
on the investment community (Ramnath et al. 2008b; Bradshaw et al. 2017), while relatively few 
papers examine the role of buy-side analysts, working for institutional investors, the most 
important clients of the investment and boutique research firms that employ sell-side analysts 
(Brown et al. 2016). Most prior academic research regarding the interactions between these two 
sophisticated groups of market participants adopts the view that information flows from sell-side 
to buy-side analysts. We add to this research by considering the bilateral information flow and by 
specifically examining the impact of private buy-side analyst information on the quality of 
publicly available sell-side analyst research. Our evidence of a non-linear relation between 
connections with institutional investors and sell-side analyst earnings forecast accuracy is 
consistent with these connections enhancing the quality of sell-side analyst research output and, 
hence, the quality of information impounded in capital asset prices, although up to a point of 
diminishing returns.  
                                                          
12 In measuring abnormal returns, we use the value-weighted market return as a proxy for expected returns. Results 
(untabulated) are similar when we use four alternative proxies for expected returns: the equal-weighted market 
returns, the average stock returns during prior 100 days, expected returns from the market model estimated for the 
prior 100 days, and expected returns estimated from the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. 
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We recognize that buy-side analysts may invest effort in choosing the sell-side analysts 
whom they wish to engage, and this choice may depend on the accuracy of sell-side analyst 
earnings forecasts. At the same time, we hypothesize that the accuracy of sell-side analyst 
earnings forecasts depends on the intensity of their connections with buy-side analysts. Our tests 
effectively untangle this endogeneity and reinforce our inference that information flow from the 
buy-side to the sell-side enhances the quality of sell-side analyst research reports. To the best of 
our knowledge, ours is the first study to show that sell-side analysts learn about the stocks they 
follow from connections with their buy-side counterparts. 
The idea of a well-connected sell-side analyst goes beyond connections with the buy-
side. For example, the analyst has connections with industry contacts that enable interactions 
with suppliers and customers; with management of public and private companies to develop a 
pipeline of future coverage; with venture capitalists and private equity firms to help her build a 
pipeline of investment banking deals and future research coverage; and with the business press 
for general visibility. Our paper only examines connections with buy-side clients, thus leaving 
room for future research. 
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Appendix  
Variables in main analyses (when scaled among the same firm-year to fall between 0 and 1, unless 
pointed out otherwise, the scaling follows 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡−min (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡)
max(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡)−min(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡
) 
|FEaft|= absolute error in analyst a’s earliest forecast, Faft, for firm f’s year t earnings issued during the 90 
days post the announcement of firm f’s year t-1 annual earnings, divided by the absolute value of 
actual earnings.   
ACCURACYaft = the difference between the maximum absolute forecast error among all forecasts of firm 
f’s year t earnings during the 90 days  post the announcement of firm f’s year t-1 annual earnings and 
analyst a’s absolute forecast error |FEaft|, scaled by the range between the maximum and minimum, 
i.e., 
max(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)−|𝐹𝐸𝑎𝑓𝑡|
max(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)−min(|𝐹𝐸𝑓𝑡|)
. ACCURACY falls on a scale between zero (least accurate) and one (most 
accurate).  
−Mean deflated |FEaft| = absolute forecasts error for analyst a, firm f, and year t, divided by the mean 
absolute forecast error among analysts forecasting annual earnings for the same firm-year, and 
multiplied by −1. 
CONNECTIONSaft = analyst a’s weighted average number of connections with institutional investors 
holding f as of the date of Faft. It is computed as the weighted number of stocks, other than f, covered 
by analyst a and held by institutions that invest in firm f, divided by the number of all institutions 
holding firm f, where the weight equals the value of the corresponding stock as a percentage of the 
value of the corresponding institution’s total portfolio. Institutional holdings are from the calendar 
quarter preceding the date of Faft, and analyst coverage of other companies is from the one year period 
that precedes the calendar quarter end used for institutional holding measurement.  
Lagged ACCURACYaft =one year lagged value of the ACCURACY variable. 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀#𝑡
𝑎 = number of firms analyst a followed in the year ending with the date of Faft. 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌#𝑎𝑡 = number of industries analyst a followed in the year ending with the date of Faft. 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑎𝑓𝑡 = number of years since the first year analyst a issued one-year ahead earnings forecasts 
for firm f up to the date of Faft.  
𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑎𝑡 = number of analysts employed by analyst a’s brokerage house or research firm in the year 
ending with the date of Faft. 
𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡 = number of days between the date of Faft and the most recent one-year ahead forecast of firm 
f’s year t earnings preceding Faft by any analyst. 
𝐸𝑃𝑆_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑎𝑓𝑡 = frequency of analyst a's one-year ahead earnings forecasts for firm f in the one-year 
period prior to the date of Faft. 
𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑎𝑓𝑡 = number of days between the date of Faft and the end of fiscal year t. 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝, and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 are measured the same 
way as the original CONNECTIONS variable except that they are constructed based on connections 
with subsets of institutions, i.e., high-, medium-, and low-opportunity institutions.   
Opportunity based on Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification: transient, dedicated, and quasi-index 
institutions are classified as having high, medium, and low private information and thus opportunities, 
respectively.  
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Opportunity based on portfolio turnover (Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers 2000): institutions with high 
(medium or low) turnover are classified as having high- (medium- or low-) opportunities.  
Opportunity based on Petajisto’s (2013): We start from Petajisto’s five investment categories − stock 
pickers, concentrated stock pickers, moderately active stock pickers, closet indexers, and factor bettors 
− and classify the first three types of institutions as active stock selectors, and the rest as passive stock 
selectors. To create the five investment categories, we follow Petajisto’s (2013, p82) two-way 
stratification approach whereby we rank all institutions first by Active Share and then by Tracking 
Error to create his five by five grid and follow his cell assignment to come with the five investment 
categories. Active Share measure is computed as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). We use the CRSP 
stock universe as the benchmark market portfolio and measure active share for the portfolio of an 
institution as the sum of the absolute differences between the institution’s portfolio weight and market 
portfolio weight in each stock. Tracking error is computed for each institution and each year as the 
standard deviation of residuals from a regression of monthly excess portfolio returns over the last 3 
years on the excess returns on the CRSP market index. The monthly excess return is computed by 
subtracting the monthly risk-free return from the monthly portfolio return. 
Variables in additional analyses 
CONNECTIONStime = the first alternative measure of connections is defined the same way as our main 
CONNECTIONS variable except that, for each a,i connection around f, the weight is determined by the 
number of months i has held the corresponding stock of mutual interest (other than f) between a and i.  
CONNECTIONSstock# = the second alternative measure of connections modifies our primary 
CONNECTIONS measure by taking the straight average number of connections across institutional 
investors based on the number of other stocks held by each institutional investor.   
CONNECTIONSinst# = the third alternative measure, computed as the number of institutions that invest in 
both the firm of interest and at least one other firm followed by the same analyst, divided by the 
number of all institutions holding the firm of interest.  
Mean deflated |FE| = absolute forecasts error for each analyst-firm-year divided by the mean absolute 
forecast error among analysts forecasting annual earnings for the same firm-year. 
CONNECTIONS_resid = residual from regressing scaled CONNECTIONS on scaled FIRM#.  
CONNECTIONS2_resid = residual from regressing scaled CONNECTIONS2 on scaled FIRM#.  
Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile residual = residual from regressing scaled CONNECTIONS in the 
bottom tercile on scaled FIRM#. Middle and Top CONNECTIONS Tercile residuals are defined 
analogously.. 
CONNECTED = 1 if an analyst has connections with an acquired or liquidated institution over the four 
quarters prior to the last form 13F filing date, and 0 otherwise. For each stock held by the 
aforementioned institution and followed by the analyst, we view an analyst as connected with this 
institution if she followed other stocks the institution held in the quarter the institution filed the last 
form 13F and in at least one of the previous three quarters. We consider an analyst as unconnected 
with the institution if she has not followed any other stock held by the institution over the last four 
quarters. 
POST_EVENT = 1 if a forecast is issued more than three months after the event described below, and 0 
otherwise. The event refers to the last date when form 13F was filed by an acquired or bankrupt 
institution. Forecasts are those issued within two years of the events. Only forecasts by analysts that 
issue one or more annual forecasts for the same firm both pre and post the events are retained.  
∆REC = prior recommendation level minus current recommendation level, with a positive value 
indicating an upgrade and a negative value a downgrade. 
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CAR = cumulative abnormal return during the three days around the recommendation changes, where 
abnormal return equals the difference between stock return (RET) and value-weighted market return 
(VWRETD) per CRSP.  
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Figure 1 − Connections Variable for Analysts a1 and a2 regarding Firm-Year f1,t, where only  
Institutions i1, i2, and i3 Hold f1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a2 follows f1, f12, f13, f14, f15, f16, f17, f18, f19, f20 
 
i1 holds f1(5%), f2(20%), f7(40%), f8(35%) 
i2 holds f1(20%), f3(45%), f5(15%), f6(20%) 
i3 holds f1(10%), f4(30%), f9(25%), f10(35%)  
Connections through firms beyond f1: 
 Analyst a1 is strongly connected with the three institutions holding f1 during year t. a1 is connected 
with i1 through f2, f7, and f8, which constitute 95% of i1’s portfolio; with i2 through f3, f5, and f6, 
which constitute 80% of i2’s portfolio; with i3 through f4, f9, and f10, which constitute 90% of i3’s 
portfolio. The unscaled CONNECTIONSf1,t variable takes on a value of (0.95+0.80+0.90)/3 = 
0.8833 for analyst a1.  
 Analyst a2 is not connected with the three institutions holding f1 during year t. The 
CONNECTIONSf1,t variable takes on a value of (0+0+0)/3 = 0 for analyst a2, the minimum among 
both analysts. 
 
Scaled CONNECTIONSf1,t variable = (unscaled CONNECTIONS – minimum Connections) / (maximum 
CONNECTIONS – minimum Connections): 
 For analyst a1: (0.8833 – 0) / (0.8833 – 0) = 1 
 For analyst a2: (0 – 0) / (0.8833 – 0) = 0  
Portfolios of all institutions that invest in f1 with 
portfolio weights for each security in parentheses 
Analysts following f1  
a1 follows f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7, f8, f9, f10 
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Figure 2 − Earnings Forecast Accuracy by Quintiles of Connections  
Panel A: Scaled forecast accuracy 
   
Panel B: Unscaled forecast accuracy 
  
Note:  
Panel A depicts the average and median values of accuracy measured as ACCURACY by quintiles of connections 
measured as CONNECTIONS, both measrues are scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year.  
Panel B depicts the average and median values of accuracy measured as −Mean deflated |FEaft| (unscaled) by 
quintiles of connections measured as CONNECTIONS (scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year).   
All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics (189,452 analyst-firm-year observations) 
 
Variables Mean p25 p50 p75 
Standard 
Deviation 
|FE| 0.768 0.048 0.132 0.378 6.708 
FE 0.421 -0.098 0.000 0.201 6.739 
ACCURACY 0.535 0.226 0.561 0.862 0.353 
CONNECTIONS (Unscaled) 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.015 
CONNECTIONStock# (Unscaled) 6.780 3.989 5997 8.466 4.540 
CONNECTIONS 0.390 0.070 0.278 0.688 0.356 
INST_OWNER# 326.461 139.000 231.000 406.000 296.714 
Lagged ACCURACY 0.532 0.222 0.556 0.858 0.353 
FIRM# 17.057 12.000 16.000 20.000 9.406 
INDUSTRY# 3.855 2.000 3.000 5.000 2.626 
FIRM_EXP 5.232 2.000 4.000 7.000 4.385 
BSIZE 65.812 22.000 51.000 99.000 55.868 
DAYS 4.327 0.000 0.000 3.000 12.208 
EPS_FREQ 6.189 4.000 6.000 7.000 2.845 
HORIZON 309.463 295.000 319.000 333.000 31.310 
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Panel B. Correlations and p-values 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CONNECTIONS (1) 1.000 
          
CONNECTIONS2  (2) 0.966 1.000 
         
 
0.000 
          
ACCURACY (3) -0.005 -0.010 1.000 
        
 
0.040 0.000 
         
Lagged 
ACCURACY 
(4) -0.010 -0.015 0.056 1.000 
       
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
FIRM# (5) 0.510 0.487 0.006 -0.011 1.000 
      
 
0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 
       
INDUSTRY# (6) 0.281 0.283 -0.009 -0.013 0.465 1.000 
     
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
FIRM_EXP (7) 0.117 0.109 0.006 -0.002 0.134 0.066 1.000 
    
 
0.000 0.000 0.012 0.296 0.000 0.000 
     
BSIZE (8) 0.132 0.119 0.003 0.005 0.082 -0.040 0.029 1.000 
   
 
0.000 0.000 0.256 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
DAYS (9) 0.089 0.105 -0.014 -0.009 0.054 0.053 0.088 0.031 1.000 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   
EPS_FREQ (10) -0.021 -0.023 -0.020 -0.065 -0.035 -0.050 -0.015 0.087 -0.013 1.000 
 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
HORIZON (11) -0.049 -0.056 -0.114 -0.008 -0.063 -0.054 -0.035 -0.031 -0.244 0.130 1.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Panel C. Correlation between connections and forecast accuracy by the range of 
connections and p-values 
Range of connections Correlation with ACCURACY 
CONNECTIONS <= 
median 
0.017 
0.000 
CONNECTIONS > 
median 
-0.020 
0.000 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics for our sample of 189,452 analyst-firm-year forecasts issued from 1995 to 2016, for 
4,564 unique firms by 8,790 analysts. The forecasts are the earliest annual earnings forecasts issued by an analyst for a 
firm-year during the 90 days post the announcement of the firm’s prior year annual earnings. For ease of interpretation, 
with the exception of ACCURACY and CONNECTIONS, no variable in Panel A is scaled among analysts for the same 
firm-year. 
Panel B presents correlation coefficients (with the associated p-values below in italics) among the main variables used in 
the analysis, where all variables are scaled among analysts making forecasts for the same firm-year. Subscripts a, f, and t 
are suppressed for brevity. 
Panel C reports correlation coefficients between CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY for the two ranges of CONNECTIONS 
(those below or at the median and those above the median). Both CONNECTIONS and ACCURACY are scaled among 
analysts making forecasts for the same firm-year 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2 – Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Connections 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coeff (std. err.) Coeff (std. err.) Coeff (std. err.) Coeff (std. err.) 
CONNECTIONS 5.516*** 4.818***   
 (0.962) (0.960)   
CONNECTIONS2 -6.127*** -5.751***   
 (0.988) (0.961)   
Break down of CONNECTIONS     
Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile   13.908*** 13.740*** 
   (3.338) (3.283) 
Middle CONNECTIONS Tercile   3.113*** 2.557*** 
   (0.701) (0.708) 
Top CONNECTIONS Tercile   0.032 -0.246 
   (0.329) (0.337) 
Lagged ACCURACY  5.210***  5.217*** 
  (0.263)  (0.264) 
FIRM#  0.945***  0.851** 
  (0.350)  (0.350) 
INDUSTRY#  -1.409***  -1.461*** 
  (0.293)  (0.294) 
FIRM_EXP  0.595**  0.604** 
  (0.248)  (0.248) 
BSIZE  -0.177  -0.138 
  (0.291)  (0.292) 
DAYS  -3.901***  -3.942*** 
  (0.257)  (0.257) 
EPS_FREQ  0.033  0.044 
  (0.259)  (0.259) 
HORIZON  -11.000***  -11.000*** 
  (0.236)  (0.236) 
Constant 53.249*** 57.895*** 53.151*** 57.810*** 
 (1.005) (1.017) (1.005) (1.017) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
N 189,452 189,452 189,452 189,452 
Adjusted R2 0.25% 2.07% 0.25% 2.06% 
 
This table examines the relation between sell-side analysts’ forecast accuracy and their connections with 
institutional investors based on the following regressions:  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑎𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡  (1) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑎𝑓𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
3
𝑘=1  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡       (2) 
𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 is an indicator variable equaling one for the kth 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 tercile (1=lowest and 3=highest) 
and zero otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in the Appendix and scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year. The 
dependent variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is multiplied by 100. 
Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Connections Stratified by Opportunities for 
Analysts to Learn 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Based on transient, 
quasi-indexers, and 
dedicated investors 
Coeff (std. err.) 
Based on turnover 
Coeff (std. err.) 
Based on 
active/passive 
investors 
Coeff (std. err.) 
CONNECTIONS High Opp  5.151***  4.041***  5.003***  
 (1.706)  (1.396)  (1.533)  
(CONNECTIONS High Opp)2 -4.414***  -4.776***  -4.687***  
 (1.605)  (1.306)  (1.431)  
CONNECTIONS Med Opp 2.124*  0.553    
 (1.151)  (1.846)    
(CONNECTIONS Med Opp)2 -2.855**  -1.113    
 (1.143)  (1.680)    
CONNECTIONS Low Opp -2.036  1.436  0.396  
 (1.766)  (1.694)  (1.542)  
(CONNECTIONS Low Opp)2 1.536  -1.333  -1.601  
 (1.657)  (1.584)  (1.469)  
Break down of CONNECTIONS       
Bottom CONNECTIONS High Opp tercile  6.423**  7.113***  9.574*** 
  (3.210)  (2.760)  (2.946) 
Middle CONNECTIONS High Opp tercile  2.596**  1.766**  1.914** 
  (1.029)  (0.866)  (0.918) 
Top CONNECTIONS High Opp tercile  1.081  -0.277  0.776 
  (0.681)  (0.536)  (0.595) 
Bottom CONNECTIONS Med Opp tercile  3.334  3.813   
  (10.292)  (3.891)   
Middle CONNECTIONS Med Opp tercile  0.339  0.247   
  (0.883)  (1.128)   
Top CONNECTIONS Med Opp tercile  -0.575  -0.363   
  (0.366)  (0.726)   
Bottom CONNECTIONS Low Opp tercile  7.338  6.839  7.499* 
  (4.503)  (4.870)  (4.455) 
Middle CONNECTIONS Low Opp tercile  -0.518  0.837  0.606 
  (1.151)  (1.109)  (1.007) 
Top CONNECTIONS Low Opp tercile  -0.336  0.291  -0.908 
  (0.679)  (0.653)  (0.575) 
Controls from Table 2 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 149,796 149,796 189,452 189,452 189,452 189,452 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 2.20% 2.18% 2.08% 2.06% 2.07% 2.06% 
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This table examines whether the sensitivity of forecast accuracy to connections increases when sell-side analysts 
have greater opportunities to learn private information from their connections with institutional investors.  
Results are from estimating the following regression model:  
ACCURACYaft = β0 + β1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 + β2(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2+ β3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝
+ 
β4(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2+ β5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
+ β6(𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝)2 +∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚  + 
𝜀𝑎𝑓𝑡 and a piecewise regressions where the terciles of 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 and 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
are the main variables of interest.  
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝
, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑝
 and 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑂𝑝𝑝
are measured the same way as the 
original CONNECTIONS variable except that they are constructed based on connections with only high-
opportunity, medium-opportunity, and low-opportunity institutions, respectively.  
In columns (1) and (2), we utilize Bushee’s (2001) categorization of institutions into transient, dedicated, and 
quasi-indexers (unclassified ones as other type) to classify institutions into high-, medium-, and low-
opportunity institutions.  
In columns (3) and (4), we classify institutions with high (medium or low) turnover as high- (medium- or low-) 
opportunity ones.  
In columns (5) and (6), we combine Petajisto’s (2013) five investment categories to classify institutions as active 
stock selectors and passive stock selectors.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix and scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year. The dependent 
variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is multiplied by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.     
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Table 4 – The Relation between Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Connections by Buy-side 
Analyst Demand   
 
                                  
 (1) 
Coeff (std. err.) 
(2) 
Coeff (std. err.) 
Variables                                   DEMAND = FIRM_EXP Lagged_ACCURACY 
CONNECTIONS  6.108*** 5.970*** 
  (1.369) (1.792) 
CONNECTIONS2  -6.888*** -6.997*** 
  (1.385) (1.871) 
CONNECTIONS× DEMAND  -3.200 -2.170 
 
 (2.456) (2.711) 
CONNECTIONS2× DEMAND  2.798 2.352 
 
 (2.388) (2.791) 
Lagged_ACCURACY  5.211*** 5.382*** 
  (0.263) (0.459) 
FIRM#  0.941*** 0.946*** 
  (0.350) (0.349) 
INDUSTRY#  -1.412*** -1.408*** 
  (0.293) (0.293) 
FIRM_EXP  1.057** 0.595** 
  (0.449) (0.248) 
BSIZE  -0.174 -0.177 
  (0.291) (0.291) 
DAYS  -3.902*** -3.901*** 
  (0.257) (0.257) 
EPS_FREQ  0.033 0.033 
  (0.259) (0.259) 
HORIZON  -10.999*** -11.001*** 
  (0.236) (0.236) 
Constant  57.722*** 57.803*** 
  (1.026) (1.039) 
N  189,452 189,452 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES 
Adjusted R2  2.07% 2.07% 
 
This table examines whether the sensitivity of forecast accuracy to connections increases with buy-side analyst 
demand for information. This table reports coefficient estimates from the following regressions. 
ACCURACYaft =β0+ β1CONNECTIONSaft + β2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2  + β3DEMAND+ β4DEMAND × CONNECTIONSaft 
β5DEMAND ×𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
2 +∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑚 + εaft     
We employ FIRM_EXP and Lagged_ACCURACY as proxies for buy-side analyst DEMAND. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix and scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year. The dependent 
variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is multiplied by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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  Table 5 – Analysis of Exogenous Shocks to Connections 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable = ACCURACY Dependent variable = −mean deflated |FE| 
Variables 
Total 
sample 
Lower connections 
subsample 
Higher connections 
subsample 
Total sample 
Lower connections 
subsample 
Higher connections 
subsample 
  
coeff  
(std. err.) 
coeff  
(std. err.) 
coeff  
(std. err.) 
coeff  
(std. err.) 
coeff  
(std. err.) 
coeff  
(std. err.) 
POST_EVENT  1.195 2.329** -1.240 0.879 1.937** -1.496 
 (0.836) (0.989) (1.548) (0.681) (0.786) (1.289) 
CONNECTED 1.116 1.901** -0.115 1.314** 1.766** 0.408 
 (0.684) (0.891) (1.205) (0.560) (0.720) (0.997) 
CONNECTED×POST_EVENT -1.310 -3.502*** 1.922 -1.303 -2.747*** 1.295 
 (0.952) (1.245) (1.647) (0.799) (1.043) (1.377) 
Constant 50.327*** 50.413*** 50.165*** -101.277*** -102.007*** -99.915*** 
 (2.278) (2.757) (3.834) (1.503) (2.182) (1.860) 
N 40,372 20,773 19,599 52,369 26,954 25,415 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% -0.03% -0.04% -0.05% 
 
This table presents analyses of changes in analyst forecast accuracy for the connected analysts relative to the unconnected analysts from pre to post the events. Events 
refer to the last dates when form 13Fs were filed by acquired or bankrupt institutions. Forecasts are those issued within two years of the events. The lower (higher) 
connection subsample includes forecasts by analysts whose scaled CONNECTIONS among all analysts following the same firm-year is at or below (above) the sample 
median of 0.2775.  
Columns (1) to (3) estimate the regression below with scaled ACCURACY that falls between 0 and 1:  
ACCURACY = CONNECTED + POST_EVENT + CONNECTED × POST_EVENT + εaft   
Columns (4) to (6) estimate the regression below with unscaled −mean deflated |FE|:  
−mean deflated |FE| = CONNECTED + POST_EVENT + CONNECTED × POST_EVENT + εaft 
Mean deflated |FE| is measured the same as in the Appendix except the mean is for the same firm-year in the pre-event or post-event period. 
All other variables are defined in the Appendix and scaled values are scaled among the same firm-year. The dependent variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is multiplied 
by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.   
49 
 
Table 6 – Alternative Measures of Connections 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Measure 1 
CONNECTIONStime 
Measure 2 
CONNECTIONSstock# 
Measure 3 
CONNECTIONSinst# 
Coeff (std. err.) Coeff (std. err.) Coeff (std. err.) 
CONNECTIONS 6.547***  6.423***  5.932***  
 (0.949)  (1.047)  (0.984)  
CONNECTIONS2 -6.585***  -6.797***  -4.429***  
 (0.931)  -0.969  -0.947  
Break down of CONNECTIONS       
Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile  4.367***  11.774***  2.611*** 
  (1.379)  (1.993)  (0.786) 
Middle CONNECTIONS Tercile  1.737***  3.184***  2.299*** 
  (0.467)  (0.729)  (0.356) 
Top CONNECTIONS Tercile  0.219  0.409  1.367*** 
  (0.301)  (0.485)  (0.304) 
Control variables in Table 2 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 189,452 189,452 189,452 189,452 189,452 189,452 
Adjusted R2 2.07% 2.05% 2.08% 2.07% 2.07% 2.07% 
 
This table replicates the analyses from specifications (2) and (4) of Table 2 with three alternative measures of the CONNECTIONS  
variable: CONNECTIONStime,  CONNECTIONSstock#, and CONNECTIONSINST#. All variables are defined as in the Appendix.  
All variables are scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year and the dependent variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is  
multiplied by 100. Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance  
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Table 7 – Alternative Measures of Accuracy  
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 
−Mean deflated |FE| as dependent variable 
Coeff (std. err.) 
CONNECTIONS 3.428**  
 (1.659)  
CONNECTIONS2 -4.916***  
 (1.714)  
Break down of CONNECTIONS  
Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile  9.503* 
  (4.936) 
Middle CONNECTIONS Tercile  1.284 
  (1.099) 
Top CONNECTIONS Tercile  -0.958* 
  (0.547) 
Lagged ACCURACY 7.000*** 7.007*** 
 (0.503) (0.505) 
FIRM# 1.360** 1.293** 
 (0.554) (0.552) 
INDUSTRY# -1.060** -1.107** 
 (0.466) (0.472) 
FIRM_EXP 1.623*** 1.632*** 
 (0.369) (0.369) 
BSIZE -0.176 -0.143 
 (0.502) (0.502) 
DAYS -4.189*** -4.228*** 
 (0.380) (0.376) 
EPS_FREQ 0.317 0.326 
 (0.394) (0.394) 
HORIZON -11.279*** -11.278*** 
 (0.338) (0.339) 
Constant -94.806*** -94.829*** 
 (1.280) (1.288) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
N 189,452 189,452 
Adjusted R2 0.92% 0.92% 
Dependent variable −Mean deflated |FE| 
 
This table presents results when forecast accuracy is measured as (−1)×mean deflated |FE|.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. All independent variables are scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same 
firm-year and the dependent variable (and, thus, each coefficient) is multiplied by 100.  
Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.   
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Table 8 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Recommendation Changes by 
Connections  
 
Variable Quadratic form Piecewise version 
∆REC 0.955*** 0.948*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) 
∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS  0.984***   
 (0.374)   
∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS2  -1.038***   
 (0.362)   
∆REC ∙ Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile   1.463** 
   (0.607) 
∆REC ∙ Middle CONNECTIONS Tercile   0.220 
   (0.143) 
∆REC ∙ Top CONNECTIONS Tercile   -0.054 
   (0.061) 
CONNECTIONS  -0.693   
 (0.458)   
CONNECTIONS2  0.749*   
 (0.448)   
Bottom CONNECTIONS Tercile   -0.984 
   (0.712) 
Middle CONNECTIONS Tercile    -0.234 
   (0.168) 
Top CONNECTIONS Tercile   0.061 
   (0.071) 
Constant 0.180 0.179 
 (0.212) (0.210) 
N 11,550 11,550 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Adjusted R2 13.2% 13.2% 
 
This table examines the impact that CONNECTIONS has on the relation between recommendation changes and the 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns around recommendation changes. The results are from estimating the 
regressions below:  
CAR[-1,+1] = β0 + β1∆REC + β2∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS + β3∆REC ∙ CONNECTIONS2 + β4CONNECTIONS + 
β5CONNECTIONS2 + ε, and  
CAR[-1,+1] = β0 + β1∆REC + ∆REC ∙ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
3
𝑘=1  +    
∑ 𝛾𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑡
3
𝑘=1  + ε   
𝐷𝑘
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 is an indicator variable equaling one for the kth 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 tercile (1=bottom, 2=middle, and 
3=top) and zero otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
CONNECTIONS is scaled to fall between 0 and 1 for the same firm-year and the dependent variable (and, thus, each 
coefficient) is multiplied by 100. Standard errors are clustered by analyst and are presented in parentheses.   
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
